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KarimA. NashashibiIn their striving toward development a number of less developed countries
have espoused bilateral trade as yet another policy instrument allowing them
to increase their acquisition of foreign resources. indeed, bilateral trade
agreementsbecame a salient feature oftrade flows throu;hout the l96Csand
recentdevelopments point to an increase in bilateraltrade's share ofworld
trade.
This has been particularly true of the trade of India, Pakistan,and
Ept,on which scm useful empirical studies have been conducted (6,7,10).
Onthe whole, however, the economic literature seems to have allocated '-ery
littletheoretical attention to the problem eventhough this type of trade
was widespreadin the 1930s. (1). Holzman and Wiles (5,11) viewbiiateraii
in the context of centrally planned econcmies and attribute its raisond'etre
tothe rigidities inherent in them (e.g., inconvertibility, carry—over from
internalbalance methods,and so forth). No attempt, however, is made to
analyzebilateral trae systematically in the context ofspecific targets and
rigiditieswhich characterize all trading alternat.ves.
The target we are interested in is not trade eficiericy as an end in
itself, but growth. And for a number of countries the ability to grow depends
verymuch on the ability to ipDrt. Hence, it is interms of this target that
we proposeto evaluate the efficiency of bilateral trade as a policy instrument
andto exaine a number of related issues, such as the terms of trade, trade
diversion, and its:';Znresource allocation.—2-.
Abrief description of bilateral trade areemerits starts our discussion,
followed by a three—country model as a theoretical formulation of the problem.
Finally, several imulictions will be derived in relation to the issues
mentioned above.
Whatdistinihesbilateral trade from multilateral trade or state
tradingisthe built—in mechanism which promotes exports in payment fcr imports.
Importsand exports need not balance in anygivenyear but the agreement moves
the two countries toward balance over a period of time (usually, three to five
years).In case one of the partners shows a deficit, a "swing credit" is
provided by thesurplus country to finance it. If thedeficit country exceeds
its credit ceiling a settlement of the balance is provided within a certain
period of time (usually six months). Such settlements usually consist of an
additional flow ofexports,although the deficit could be settled with:cnvertible
foreignexchange. Since the two modes of settlement are not cualitatiely different
aswill be shownbelow -westart by assuming that the trade is to be commodity—
balanced.
Themodel
It is pointless to discuss bilateral trade in comparison to multilateral
trade without pcsingecific restrictior,s since in a standard theory of trade
approach bilateral trade wouldappearboth primitive and inefficient. Sufficient
to say thatundermultilateral trade and perfect market conditions a country
would, sell itscommoditiestothe highest bidder and buy fromthe cheapest source
cver the largest set of buyers and sellers. Hence it would reap the highest terms
of trade. Multilateral trade is also compatible with all kinds of restrictive
practices such as price discrimination, state trading and export taxes which
tend to maxim!se a country's benefits from trade whenever it ceases to be a
price talcer (2).In this sense a unilateral' moncpoly is superior to bilateral—3—
monopoly. In:case a chronic deficitin the balance of payments develops,
an adjustment in its exchangeratetogether with the manipulation of its
monetary anifcal instrurents should restore equilibrium.
In order to pose the problem it is necessary to specify a set of
conditions which, when they arise, reduce the effectiveness of multilateral
trade and invaliaate some of its advantages. :the1930s these conditions
were the acu;e shortage of international liquidity which resulted from the
collapseof the goldstandard and the need to push employment through exDorts
inthe wake of thedepression and reparation payments (3).Today, while
under—develcied countries do not face the problem of a depressed aggregate
demand they nevertheless want to stimulate theirrow-th: on theone hand they
have high import requirements necessary to realize investments which wouldhelp
them break away from the low—growth traditional structure oftroduction; On
theother handthistraditional structure is incapable of suDlying the kind
and amount of exports necessary to pay for the required imports (with the
exception of oi. producers). if sufficient means of payment were vailable by
international oranizatjons such development could be financed,prcvi-ed credit
is extended over a period long enough to lead to theemergence of a new vintage
of exports which would be sufficient topay for the present and future imports.
fulfilling
However, such eans of payment fall far short of/sound investmentpossibilities
and most underdeveloped countries are forced to finance their irtsthrcugh
theirexports.This usually means to restrict their imports to the level of
exports the country can sell ccsetitive1v abroad at goingexchane rate.
Such export basket is mostly composed ofprimary ccmmodities (rawmaterialsand
tood) and simple manufactures in which these countriesdeveloped a comparative
advantage. The first group of cc.modities has frequently encounteredsluggish
1/Wiles,(8)p.271.growth and downward sloping demand curves while th second has been strongly
resisted by buyer countriesin protection of their owninefficient industries
(textiles,leather goods).
Eence, le:.s developed countries engaged in bilateral agreer-ents view
this trade as an oçDortunity of accuiring additional importsnecessary to
their developnentai process without agravatin their balanceof payent probls,
thanks to an increase in theirexports, particularly the "nontraditional"
coodities.
To derive the properties of bilateral trade under policy target, which
attempts to satisfy a certain import bill and the trading restrictions which
prevail in world markets, we shall set up the following model:
Let us call our less developed country, country III and letus assume
it has only two trading partners: country II with which it tradeson a bilateral
basis —weshall refer to it as a "tied market" or "II" —andcountry Iwith
which it trades only for convertiblecurrency (free market). II and I have
many trade partners other than III and any amount of a commodity exported by
them to III only forms a small proportion of their totalexports of that
commodity. Hence, we consider III as a price taker on the import side.The
prices quoted by the free market serve as "world prices" forcountry III. Clearly,
there is no a priori reason why prices quoted from II should behigher or lower
than those quoted by I. These wouldvary for each commodity according to its
export availabilities and cost conditions as well as its assessment of III's
relative need of the commodity, its ability to purchase from thefree market
and so forth. Hence, while the free marketquotes a single world price for
each commodity, the tied market can practiceprice discrimination vis—.—vis
its trading partners.
However, even if export prices under bilateralagreements do not exceed
the cheapest alternative source ofsupply the purchasing power of the proceeds—5—
fromthe exports is limited by the choice set of exports offered by countryII
toIII. This choice rait differ substantially fromthecommodities which
rank high among III's import priorities. Hence, the "real" price received
for III's exports is lower than its ncina1 value. In this case a simple
comparison of prices quoted from the free market, and from tied narkets is not
sufficient, since the means of paymentdiffer.''eshall attempt in thismodel
tobring out with some degree of precision the real returns that our less de-:elcped
country reaps when it trades its exports against a set of specific imports
rather than for convertible exchange. We would want to comtare a hyotheticai
situation where all the exports are paid for in convertible currency to the
real situation where only part of the export's proceeds are in convertible
currency while the rest are to be chosen from a set of potential imports.
Suppose III's totcal export availabilities can be denoted by a SUiY
vectors (s...s...s.) where each variety or zrade of a product is treated 3 ii 3j
as a distinct corr.modity (j =i....n).From it countryIwill draw a set of
exports denoted by vector E1 and II will draw a set of exports E2.To and





R1and R2aredenominated in a cor.vertible currency, say dolars.
However, while the amount R1E1wcu.ldbe actually transferred to III and can be
disposed of at wi11, represents simply a credit to the account ofIII,
whichcan cniy be used foranequivalent purchase of exports from II. It
should be stressed at this point that a less developed country cannot sell as
much as it would want to country I out of its export basket. Indeed,thefree
market will distribute itspurchasesamong the nueroussourcesof supply which
can quote roughly the sameworid price on a c.i.f. basis and amongthcsewith—6—
whomit entered intosoe preferential agreement. Hence, unlike the perfect
marketmodel where a large demandfor a productis translated into horizntal
demandcurvesfra multitudeofsellers, differences in c.i.f. importcosts,
inproduct varieties andtheprevailance of auantitative restrictions viii
resultin a ezancurve which will rapidlyslope downward past a certain .uantity
sold. Thus, country III will ta:e 1E1 as given arid attempt to expand its
exports towards country II.
Furthermore, IIvililiave a vectordenoting its import requirements
for the forthcoming planning period. These could be derived from various
investment appropriaticns and various disaggregated import functions. To this
vectoris associated a weight vector W which will indicate III's preference
for each of its inport requirements.These weights could be akin tc dual
variables derived from a global programmingmodel a la Frisch andreflecting
thenet increase inthe value of a welfare function resulting from an addition
ofa unitofexpenditure on a particular import. Or more simply, they can
roughly indicate a rankingofimport priorities among various investment g.ods,
raw material and consumer goods.'
CountryIII will choose its imports from two supply vectors (or export
availabilities) S and S2, offered by countries I and II. To theoe are attached
price vectors P1 and From these supply vectors, country III will have to
pick two import vectors and in such a way as to get as close as possible
to its import requirements M under the constraint of its foreigh exchar.ge
resources V3. In addition, any quantity imported of a particular commodity from
a given source cannot exceed the availability of that commodity for export by
the same source (e.g.m.
).
1/Je do not assign weights to exports. In general their prices would reflect
their opportunity ccsts as investment or cor.umption goods. To be sure s:e of
the export prices would be in line with "world" prices. ?ence prcitabiiity m:n
export goods (in terms ofdo—estic resources usedrer unit of rei:n exchanTeernea
coid\-arv. -;'st€qf wei 't on exncrts would hen be rc:rate.
r.u'etie•snl.tri attr.e prbiemmor rrai without, :erinreSumnarisin we have:



















n in 2n 2n
weights on III's import requirements: w =
pricesattached to S1: P1 1:"j"
prices attached to S2; P2 =(p21.. p2 "2n
We shall now define a function on the set of possible import vectors. This
will be a subset of RXR1(cartesianproduct of two real vector spaces of
dimension n) andwillbe bound by countrj III's iiport requirements, its
export possibilities (resources available for ir-ports) and byI and II's export
availabilities to country III (s,2)The function defined on this set will
rank couples of import vectors according to III's preferences W.
(2) f(,M2) =>!_
wm.j
where i =1,2 and j =1 In.
The restriction on the set of possible import vectcrs will be:
— 7-.—8—
(2a) Supplyrestrictions: Sjj
(2b) Import recuirerent restriction:
(2c) Rescurce restrictiOn: 2 n
p1 4m.
i=1 j=l
Given the restriction posed, the set of irprtpsibilitieSwillbea
closed, and bounded set (call it H) in -t:e spacex i. Therefore it is
coipact.'This assures the existence of a possible ccbinatiOfl of inport
vectorsfrom the two sources which axi'izes the function f over H and thereby
offers country III a best coice of irnports. enote one such combination by
(M1,M2)* for which f(M1,M2)* =ax.
!ow suppose we restrict the import vector from the free market to our
availability of convertible currency naeiy to R1E1.Then oursetwill be
further restricted to a new set H1 by the condition:
(2d)P1M1 ￿R1E1
In the case, where the value of ouroptirnuimport vector from the free
market exceeds our availability of foreini exchange (P1M,*.￿_R1E)
then f(M1M2) will reach over H1 a maximum f(?.i1M2) where
This result hinges, however, on the uniticity of the maximum reached over each
of the two sets. To start with, it is easy to show that each of the 'two sets
1/ Hykakane Nihaido: (8),p.9.—9-
isconvex)1This mears that if we have a maximum, we could have either one
or infinitely many. The oecond outcome (which is a case of degeneracy) can
be avoided; for, there exists a vector of weihts W which, when appropriately
chosen, wouldyielda uniauesolution.'
Let us now measure the difference between the tworraximums attained
under the two sets of restrictions by A. Wewill refer to it as the
bilateral trade factor (BTF).
(3) A = f(MM*-f(M1,M2).
willmeasure the degree to which country III is diverted from its
optimal import combination by the stipulation that it should receive a share
1/ By definiticn oursetof possible import vectors is convex if for any two
points of the set (M1,M2)1, (M1,M2)2, a linear combination of these two
points will fall within the set. That is (Q (M ,M2),=(l —Q)(M,M))
where O QL..l. will be an importcombinationwithin the new set. Clearly
for any value of Q the restrictions which jefine the set are satisfied.
2/ In this diagri A3 is a line of all points for which the functionassunes
avalue .inthe space and a maximum over oursubsetH1 I'
2n
R.Supposethis line coincides with a.sement FG of the set.
There is an infinite number of points on the segment FG,
for which the function assumes a maximum. In order to assure
uniticity we can find a W as close to W as we want such that
____________theangle of the line AB rotates by
a— 10-
ofits import 2j m24 form a particular source nelythe tied market.
J=l
Therefore the realreturnwhich country III receives for its exports from
the tied market is the nczinal revenue deflated by a factor
(normalized).To normalize we set the following equation.
=f(TAM*
—
Thenumerator reflects the difference between max and the s:uticn.
obtained under constraint 2d. If the bilateral partner offers a choice
of export which is both appropriate to hIts requirements (as deterined
by W and competitive (as determined by P2) to the point where the vector
in the initial solution exhausts III's proceeds from country II for its
expor.s the constraint 2d is not binding andAo.
Thedenominator reflects the difference between max* and the unlikely
situationwhere there is nothing the bilateral partner can sell to country III,
noteven for transhipment to country II or stockpiling, and where thereal
value of IIIs proceeds from exports to II is zero. In this case
weighted by W is a zero vector and f(M1M2) acquires a value of
If that situation were to occur \willacquire an upper bound of 1.A
more likely outcome would arise when, while 2maybe zero, the proceeds
from exports to country II (RE) are used to obtain M20 as a substitute
for what could have been obtained from I under sufficient foreign exchange
availability. Of course will bear lower weights and/or higher prices
than the equivalent imports which would have been obtained from I amd therefore:
M20WZ -
Inthis case(as in cases where I42
*
0,)wewill have lNL..O.— 11—
SinceXisa i':s factor with respect to the tied narket, the actual
returns on III's total exports viii be:
(5) V= + (1—)R22 where oL>Li
Now, the srnaller the value of th re efficient would the bilater
trade be with ccuntrj III, and hence the cre desirable the division of total
trade between bilateral and multilateral flows. ut even where is
relatively large to the ectent that it increases III's level of exports
above what it would have been under purely multilateral flows, it ay still
be beneficial. In what follows we shall draw the irplications steruing from
the model and discuss the various factors which determine the value of
Bilateral markets as preferential zarkets
A small illustration reveals here the preferential market nature of
bilateral trade. Since the two trading partners may offer competing sets of
exports, a possible import combination for country III can be represented by






Theintersection of the two sets (E1fl B2) encom;asses those cotic
which are competitive from the two countries (on a c.i.f. importbasis)and
bear the same weight. Hence, a Driori, the function would be indifferent
asto whether they are i::ported from countr- Iorcountry II. However, in the
processof finding a maximum and as restrictions (2d) become binding, the
functions willshift co:4etingimpcrts to the imDort vector from the biaterai
trade partner. :ence, country II is a preferred market of country I by virtue
ofthefact that any increment of Imports from II can be matched by exports
fromIII,while the level of importsfromI does not bear such a relation.
Noticethat this can occur over a certain range without efficiency lOSS as
the shift of all competing imports to II does not affect max.*
However, as other imports begin to move to II under the convertible exchange
+
constraint,max.* starts to fail along the path of max.Itsimply means that
the cost of transforming domestic resources into foreign resources has riser..
Nevertheless, this cost might still be lower than the alternative offered by
multilateral markets. The relatively higher terms of trade which can be
fetched in the bilateral market would result from a higher demand elasticity
facing the productsmarketed. Andthis for two reasons:
i) on account of the preferential treatment the demand curvefacingcountry IIIs
product in the protected bilateral market will be more elastic than in the free
market where all competitors have equal access. This can be demonstrated within
the framework of Sweezy's diagram (9):
A— 13—
Wehave two dcmand curves: A is drawn on the assumption that only country
III can reduce the price of a given ccmmodity, while its competitors hold
their own; B is drawn on th assumption that all competing countries to III
reduce their price of that commodity.Clearly a preferential treatment
allows country III to move along curve A while multilateral trade would move
it alongthefar less advantageous curve B.
ii) It is presumed that the elasticities of substitution among consumption
goods for the countries engaged in bilateral trade would be higher than for
developed countries engaged in multilateral trade.This results from the
foreign exchange constraint under which tied markets oterate and hence the
lower order of preferences they would have for quality refinements, model
changes and pure consumer choice.'
Comlenent an ty
The advantages which III can reap from bilateral trade depends very much
on the export basket II has to offer. One would want vector (the optimum
import vector to be drawn from the tied market) to have as many positive
elements in it as possible and be weighted as heavily as possible. This would
occur when II is both able to offer the commodities which meet III's itort
requirements and to do it at competitive prices (world prices or better).
In a sense, a high degree of complementarity of II's export basket to III's
import requirements would reduce the possibility of R1E1 being binding and
would tend to make Asmallin case does hold as a constraint. When one
of the bilateral partners is industrially advanced and large, implying varied
export and import baskets, such a comleentarity might naturally occur.
1/ Tourism is a case in point. Whereas residents of Western Europe can choose
anycountry where to spend their vacations, tourists of Eastern Europeancountries
oftenhave their choices restricted to those countries with whomtheyhave bilateral
agreemnts.— 114—
Onthe other hani,za11countries may experience larger values of X
resultingfrom the disparity between their demands and their partner's supply
availabilities. This ci be rnedied if the ex-Dort availabilities to each
partner are increased and if the new export availabilities are competitive.
Whereasthis is difficultto do for any single country within a short period of
time,itcan be easilydone within a group ofcountrieswhich opt for the
convertibility of their currency (within the group).Thus each ccuntry
will now face the export availabilities of all the other mbers of the
group which will both increase cozplenentarity and the competitiveness of
the bill of imports offered. This "multilaterally balanced trade" is now
being applied .thin Fastern Europe through ruble convertibility within the
Comecon and would approach Frisch's ideal (14).
Trade Diversion and Long-Term Ecuilfbriurn
Since, as we have seen above, export returns are in general icuer under
bilateral than under multilateral trade, it would be in the interest of
country III to sell everything it can in free markets at the going price and
then allocate the remainder of its export availabilities to tied arkets.
This would maxiizze the terra in equation (1) hence re:Iucing the size
of the constraint (2d) and help minimize .Itis likewise in the interest
of the partner country (country II) to have a set of imports facing it which
would be as close to its import priorities as possible. For instance,
country II would want to buy on a bilateral basis certain primary comodities
or food items such as rice, rubber or tea to which it attaches a high pricr'y
and which it would otherwise buy for convertible exchange. Hence the r.agni——15 —
tudeof the variable for each of the trading partners becomes a matter of
bargaining arid subject to economic and political influence. Under this
bargaining s:me trade could be diverted from free markets into tied markets
so as to reducethe divergence between import needs and export availabilities
whichmightarisemoreacutely for one of the partners. For instance,
Erpt is aprice taker in rab markets for rice. evertheless, it might
beforced to divert part cf these potential sales for convertible exchange
to Eastern European countries in order to diversify its limited list of




where (1 isa diagonal matrix denoting for each.. the proportion of
e1whichhas been diverted intoe2. (where E2 + E"). Clearly
a lower R1E1 will restrict even further and hence would increase XtoA
Hence,trade diversion in this case reduces the ai'ount of convertible exchange
available for imports from free markets which in turn worsens the term of
exchange with tied markets. Conversely, it imporves the relative terms of
trade of the bilateral partner. Therefore, it is equivalent to the settlement
of a deficit sustained byoneof the parties to a trade in convertible foreign
exchange.
Aside from this deliberate trade diversion arising out of the bargaining
process between the two partners some trade diversions may occur as a result
of a general slackening of efforts in preserving market shares obtained in
convertible currency areas, let alone gaining additional markets.
.1—16—
This process mightbefurther encouraged by the price illusion fostered by
the nominal export price vector Hence the total revenue from trade when
the country only trades on a multilateral basis mightsubstantially exceed
what is actually sold on free nrketswhen italso engaged in bilateral trade.
If the country fetches a hypothetical g in foreign exchangewhen it trades
solely on a multilateral basis its net gains in export returnsfrom bilateral
trade will be:
(7) bV" —g
Both trade diversion and the value ofXcanbe reduced bysimply
lowering the overall volume of export and import which enterunder the bilateral
agreement. This can stem from a lower level of optimum (!&1M2)*orconversely
by restricting import requirements M or adapting them to theavailabilities
of the bilateral partner through a different W. In any case, it becomes a
question of trading off a higher fulfillment of on&s import requirements
against a higher domestic resource cost of one's exports, implied by a higher
equilibrium would be reached at a point j\*wherethe marginal efficiency of
anadditionalunitofforeign resources acquired through trade equals the
marginal domestic resource cost of paying for it.
Over some time horizon a process of adjustment will take place both to
eliminatetrade diversion and to maximize profits from experts. For trade
diversion need only occur inaninitial periodwhenthe country is not adjusted
tothe bilateral/multilateral allocation. illthelonger run,provided the supply
of exports iselastic,such trade diversion can be eliminated.
Likewise with respect to A.iftradeistobe fair between the two
partners, wewouldhave*
=\*, providedthey are derived frorn the same
system ofweights.Hcwever, itwouldbe purely coincidental if =
1,, 2— 17—
Hence,the movement towards such an equality can only be achieved through
timeas the appropriate adjustments are made inthe exportandimport vectors
ofthetwo trading partners.
Allocativeeffects of bilateral trade
Someof the literature ccncerr.ed with trade among East European contries
often brinout the possibility of trading in the"wrong" cczzcdity, i.e.,
wherea commodity which should have been imported is exported at aloss.' How-
ever, it would bemisleadingto associate this possibility to the practice of
trading on a bilateral basis. For it would always be to the country's interest
to offer those commodities in which it has a comparativeadvantage.'Those
commodities which are priced above the world price will either be rejected by
the trading partner of ifaccepted would tend to increase hismaking this
bilateraltrade less attractive to him and forcing eventually a reallocation
of imports and exports. However, if a country will not produce a "wrong"
commodity as a result ofbilateraltrade itmightincrease the production of
those commodities which are highly desired by the bilateral trading partners or
thea to his specifications.
Ontheimport side, the reallocation ofresourcemight still he rore pro-
nounced. Investment allocationsamongindustries as well as the choice of
techniques involved rright be decided by thebillof goods offered as imports
bythetrading partner. This investment reallocation would increase the weights
In favor of the bilateral partner and hence reduce the value of -cuever,
1/ (5),p.245.




whereis the export price, t the transport ccst, vthe rate of exchange,v'the
of currencycvervaluation and z. the"world"price of cozmodity jin
market i.—:8—
apart from the cornplex questicn pertaining to the overall cost of such a
reallocation (from an efficiency point of view) it brings out the problem
of economic dependence which may become severe for a small country adapting
its import and export bills to a large bilateral partner.
Aidthrouh trade
Itis cconly agreed that aid through trade consists in granting credit
toan underdeveloped countryfor the purchase of imports to be repaid at a
laterdatewith exports. This is a form of bilateral trade where one party
fulfills the agreement at a later date against the payment of interest. In
this framework, however, the element of time (deferred payment) need not be a
necessary characteristic of aid. Let us define, at any point in time, a purely
—1/ commercialtransaction as one where the two partners have equivalent \'s.—
Then,country II would be providing aid through trade to country IIIif
X2\
Thisisa form of aid which is frequently overlocked for it is not
tiedto specific projects but applies to regular yearly flcvsof imports and
exports.
Withrespect to aid which is projecttied there is some confusion in each
caseas to the exact amount of aid provided. A full easure of such aid should
take into account the following three factors.
1. Difference in interest rate between that which is charged by the
donor country and the equivalent going market rate.
2. Difference in prices charged by the donor country on the ecuipment
specified in the aid agreementand thegoing world prices for equi-
valent equipment.
3.Differencein the weighted value of the goods sent as repayment to
the donor country and the goods which the donor country would have
bought had it received convertible exchange.
1/ We assume the weichting systems used for the two sets of import requirements
to be the same.—19-
Factors 1 and 2 can be measured in isolation of the annual bilateral trade
flows with the donor country. For instance, the difference in prices in factor
2 can be expressed as a percentage of the total value of equipment arid added to
the nominal interest rate. Factor 3, however, is a function of the absolute
level of bilateral trade flows between the two countries. Indeed, bilateral
trade flows would have already encompassed for the donor country its preferred
imports from the aid receiving country. Hence, any additional imports would
have relatively lower weights attached to them. The proper method fcr the donor
country to easure wouldbe first to cc.pute would reflect the relative
deteriorationinthe weighted value of the goods used as repayr.ents by the aid
receiving country. This deterioration in the terms of trade plus the interest
foregone on the financing of the imports will represent to the dc.nor countrythe
cost of providing the aid. The same procedure could be applied to the aid
receiving countries, and as it often happens in aid programming the value of
the aid to the receiving country may diverge substantially from the cost of aid
to the donor country.
We can now surarize the conclusions shown from our model:
1.Bialteral trade is essentially a preferential trade agreement, where ccmmoditie
of the two trading partners receive a preferential treatment, in their respective
markets. From a two—country point of view and under market restrictions governing
multilateral flows it is trade creating and need not involve any loss factors
as long as it is limited to the exchange of competitive comiodities.From a
1/ world point of view ithasthe limitationsof anytariff club.— when pushed
beyond the exchange of competitive commodities, bilateral trade involves a
loss factor since rettirns from exports to the trading partners become restricted
1/ The limitations are brought out by the Theory of Common arkets, see (3).— 20—
toa set of imports which gradually exceed world prices, (the acceptance of
produdts which depart from certain sDecification requirements is another
dimension of price). This in effect reduces the real value of export returns
received from the bilateral partner. owever, since world prices are cften
exogenously given and may include excess profits to the exporter, the loss
factor can Simply be viewed as a discount factor which takes advantage of
elastic demand curves for the cocodity traded in their privileged markets.
Hence, on one hand the terms of trade under bilateral agreement tend to improve
on account of the preferential factor but on the other hand they tend to worsen
under the restriction which bilateralism imposes on the import set of each partner.
2.The more complementary the two partners in their import—export bundlesthe
greater the efficiency of bilateral trade. Hence, the inclusion of additional
partners will broaden the variety cf goods to be traded andacommon currency
areawith an overall balance between imports and exports for each trade partner
willbemore efficient than bilateral trade ficus.
3.Tradediversionfrom multilateral markets to bilateral markets is not an
inherent feature of bilateral trade by a temporary measure intended to provide
adequate payment to a high level of the bilateral partner. Basically, it a:onts
to the settlement of a deficit in the trade flows with convertible foreign exchange.
However, as the country adjusts in its allocation of resources to an optimum level
of the bilateral trade, such diversion need not occur.
i.e.Aid through trade is viewed in this framework as a sequential balancing of
bilateral trade where the aid component of tho donor country consists of net
interest foregone on the transaction andtheloss factor involved in a repayment
which consists in commodities rather than convertible exchange.— 21—
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